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WHAT LOGIC CAN AND CANNOT TELL US 
ABOUT LAW 
Kevin W. Saunders* 
While a symposium on logic and law should probably focus on 
what logic can do for law, there is also a "cannot" aspect of the rela-
tionship between logic and law that deserves some mention. In fact, 
there would appear to be at least three paths through the study of 
logic that might provide some insight into, or help to, law, but one of 
'those paths is a dead end. While the second leads to some enlighten-
ment, it should be followed with some caution. The third path, if it 
could be followed, would be of great benefit, but it is not adequately 
blazed. The first, dead-end path is the use of logic to divine some-
thing of the nature of law itself, that is, to attempt to resolve jurispru-
dential questions. The second is the use of logic in analyzing the 
practice oflaw, that is, as a measure of the validity oflegal argumenta-
tion. While that use may provide insight and lead to rigor in legal 
argument, there may be a tendency toward blind obedience to princi-
ples of logic that may not always be valid or fruitful in the legal arena. 
The third is the role of logic in making law amenable to the tools of 
artificial intelligence. There, however, the logic is not sufficiently de-
veloped to serve adequately its intended purpose. That is not an in-
dictment of logic or of logic and law, but instead a call for increased 
effort in the area. 
1. LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF LAw 
Logic has been used as a tool,' or a model, in discussing the na-
ture of law where the issue has been the status of hard cases. Does the 
existing law always provide an answer to a legal question, so that the 
judge is never faced with situations in which there is no law and in 
which the judge must exercise discretion? Approaching the same is-
sue from the other extreme might it be that law is radically indetermi-
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; VISiting James Madison Chair and 
Acting Director of the Constitutional Law Resource Center, Drake University Law 
School. AB. Franklin & Marshall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D. University of Miami; J.D. 
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nate and never dictates an answer, so that the judge exercises 
discretion in all cases? This is a complex issue. It is clear that situa-
tions arise in which the proper application of law is in dispute, with 
past precedent or statutes not squarely on point, but there are juris-
prudential theories that suggest how the interpretation of law might 
lead to solutions in those situations.1 Certainly logic can playa role in 
assessing the strength of the arguments in that jurisprudential debate. 
The issues are somewhat philosophical in nature, and it is to philoso-
phy and mathematics that logic is most strongly tied. The misuse of 
logic is to hold it up as a model for law in an attempt to resolve that 
debate. The mistake is to be found primarily in the belief that logic is 
a single, undisputed system that is of universal application, and that 
mistake seems to have been made by both sides in the debate over 
hard cases. 
One of the earlier such seeming uses of logic is by Ronald Dwor-
kin.2 The "seeming" is important, because while part of his argument 
clearly rests on logic, a position with regard to logic colors much of 
the rest of his argument. He begins by characterizing the no-right-
answers position as a rejection of what he calls the bivalence thesis, or 
what is usually called the law of the excluded middle, that is, that the 
compound proposition "p or ~p" must be true. Put another way, for 
any proposition, either the proposition or its negation must be true. 
Dworkin then goes on to examine and dismiss various arguments 
against the rejection of bivalence. 
The argument rejecting perhaps the most important of the na-
right-answers arguments, that of the legal positivists, contains a logical 
flaw. Dworkin puts the positivist position into symbols as a claim that, 
if "p" is a proposition of law and "L(p)" represents the fact that a 
person or group has acted in such a way that makes "p" true, then "p" 
cannot be true, unless "L(p)" is true.3 The positivist position, which 
appears reasonable, is that "p" becomes a proposition of law, only 
when a person or body occupying a particular position has acted in 
such a way as to make it law. He proceeds to assert then that "~p" 
cannot be true unless "L(~p)" is true.4 If the person or body in the 
required position has not acted toward "p" or toward "~p," that is if 
both "L(p)" and "L(~p)" are false, then the positivist concludes that 
"p" and "~p" are both false, and bivalence fails. 
1 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). 
2 See Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1978). 
3 See id. at 16. 
4 See id. 
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Dworkin's rejection of this argument is based on an assertion that 
the positivist is assuming a distinction between "L(~p)" and "~L(p)" 
that does not in fact exist. He argues that, if "L(p)" is equivalent to 
"p," then "~p" is equivalent to "~L(p)," and since "~p" is equivalent to 
"L(~p)," "~L(p)" and "L(~p)" must be equivalent.5 Since it would ap-
pear to be sound to argue that either "L(p)" or "~L(p)" must be true, 
that is, that bivalence does hold here, then either "p" or "~p" must be 
true. The problem, however, is in his assumptions with regard to the 
relationship between "L(p)" and "p." The positivist can agree with, 
and indeed builds his or her theory on, the assertion that "p" is a 
proposition of law if and only if L(p), but the real equivalence here is 
between "'p' is a proposition of law" and "L(p)," not between "p" and 
"L(p)." There is then also a similar equivalence between "'~p' is a 
proposition oflaw" and "L(~p)," but not between "~p" and "L(~p)," so 
the argument breaks down. 
What is perhaps more important than this logical error in an arti-
cle containing other strong nonformal arguments is a general tenor 
that there is something suspect in denying the thesis of bivalence. 
This is a belief that logic can tell us something of the nature of law, 
but in fact the resort to the nature of logic simply shifts the argument 
from a debate over the nature of law to an equivalent debate over the 
nature of logic. There is, once again, not a single, universally applica-
ble system of logic. The debate over whether one of "'p' is a proposi-
tion oflaw" or "'~p' is a proposition oflaw" must be true is similar to a 
problem discussed by Aristotle.6 For the positivist, where the sover-
eign has not acted, both alternatives represent future contingents, 
similar to Aristotle's example, ["t]here will be a sea battle tomorrow." 
Tomorrow it will be either true or false that there is a sea battle, and 
once ajudge has spoken "p" or "~p" will be law, but what are the truth 
values of those propositions today? Is the truth value today simply the 
same as it will be tomorrow, though today unknown, or are the state-
ments neither true nor false? 
While the law of the excluded middle holds that one of the two is 
true today, that "law" represents only one response to the issue of in-
determinates. The two potential responses were taken up by different 
post-Aristotelian schools of philosophy. The Stoics, in keeping with 
their determinist metaphysics, adopted the principle of bivalence. 
Since the occurrence or non-occurrence of tomorrow's sea battle is 
already determined by past events, the truth value of the sea battle 
5 fd. at 18. 
6 AN. Prior, Many Valued Logics, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 1, 1 (Paul 
Edwards ed., 1967). 
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prOpOSItion is already fixed today. The Epicureans, in contrast, al-
lowed for indeterminacy in their metaphysics, where chance occur-
rences or human choice played a role. In keeping with that position, 
they rejected the principle of bivalence and held that the sea battle 
proposition is neither true nor false but of indeterminate or neuter 
truth value. 
The truth value of future contingents continued as a focus of dis-
cussion for Medieval logicians. Duns Scotus and Ockham considered 
neuter propositions as being different from those that are either true 
or false, and their work might be viewed as early attempts at develop-
ing three valued logics. An indeterminate truth value, however, 
caused problems for other scholars of the Christian era. Thomas 
Aquinas and others rejected the possibility of an indeterminate truth 
value, because it implied that there could be no Divine foreknowledge 
where future contingents were involved. If the proposition was inde-
terminate, then not even God could know whether there would be a 
sea battle tomorrow. Such theological concerns were debated from 
Medieval times and are of interest even in the modern era.7 The re-
sult of the Christian influence was the continued development of two 
valued logic, while three valued logic was dormant until the late nine-
teenth century.s Thus, while it might seem that the no-right-answers 
position could be refuted by showing it to be inconsistent with the 
most common system of logic, in fact, the effort simply turns the de-
bate into one about logic that is of even older vintage and perhaps 
even less subject to resolution. 
Logic or metalogic had also been a tool of those who would argue 
that there are cases with no right answer. Professors Farago,9 Rogers 
and Molzon,Io Brown and Greenberg,ll and D'Amato,I2 among 
others, have all attempted to find some insight into the nature of law 
through an examination of the implications of Godel's Theorem.I3 
7 See, e.g., A.N. Prior, The Formalities of Omniscience, 37 PHILOSOPHY 114 (1962). 
8 For a brief history of the development of three valued logic, see Prior, supra 
note 6, and NICHOlAS REsCHER, MANY VALUED LOGIC 1-16 (1969). 
9 See John M. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Rale of Uncertainty in the Concept of Law, 
55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 195 (1980). 
10 See John M. Rogers & Roger E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self 
Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REv. 992 (1992). 
11 See Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On FormaUy Undecidable Prapositions 
of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HAsnNGS LJ. 
1439 (1992). 
12 See Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Stat-
utes?, 75 VA. L. REv. 561 (1989). 
13 For a discussion of Godel's Theorem and an explanation of the proof, see 
ERNEST NAGEL &JAMES R. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF (1958). 
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Godel's Theorem demonstrates that any formalization of arithmetic is 
incomplete; that is, whatever axioms are used as the basis for proving 
the theorems one would expect to hold for arithmetic, there will al-
ways be arithmetic propositions for which neither the proposition nor 
its negations can be proved using those axioms. Since Godel's Theo-
rem proves that there will always be gaps, the addition of further axi-
oms for arithmetic will not fill the gaps. There will always remain an 
infinity of unprovable propositions. 
Professor D'Amato's position is that Godel's Theorem carries 
over to law. If so, there will always be an infinity of legal propositions 
that can be neither proved nor disproved.14 Similarly, Brown and 
Greenberg conclude that "Go del's Theorem reveals that the law can-
not be a determinate formal system."15 Professors Rogers and 
Molzon, seemingly reluctant to apply Godel's Theorem directly to law, 
:nonetheless state "Godel's Theorem strongly suggests that it is impos-
sible to create a legal system that is 'complete' in the sense that there 
is a derivable rule for every fact situation."16 
Professor D'Amato also draws guidance from the Lowenheim-
Skolem Theorem, which states that for any axiom set for an area of 
mathematics there will be an infinite variety of alternate interpreta-
tions or models for those axioms.17 Put another way, for any attempt 
to develop a set of axioms from which the properties of a particular 
mathematical model may be derived, there will be alternative mathe-
matical systems that also satisfy the same axioms. Based on the 
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, D'Amato concludes that "even a highly 
formalized set of rules, such as the Restatements of Contracts and 
Torts, can consistently be said to 'apply' to mutually inconsistent de-
scriptions of fact situations."18 
Professor Ken Kress attacks t:4ese uses of metamathematics to 
draw conclusions about the nature of law.19 As he points out, the 
14 See D'AIDato, supra note 12, at 597. 
15 Brown & Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1487. Brown and Greenberg's conclu-
sion that law cannot be a determinate "formal system" might be read to allow the 
possibility that law is a determinate informal system, but it seems unlikely that they 
would take that position. Specifically addressing such a possibility, D'Amato argues 
that if law is a nonformal system, it's very informality must make it indeterminate. See 
Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 176 n.92 (1990). 
16 Rogers & Molzon, supra note 10, at 992. 
17 See Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 
U. MIAMI L. REv. 513, 521 n.28 (1989). 
18 D'Amato, supra note 15, at 175-76. 
19 See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 134 
(1990). 
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L6wenheim-Skolem Theorem only applies to rigorously defined for-
mal systems, stating: 
English] [ and legal language are insufficiently precise for the asser-
tions and inferences of a formal proof such as the L6wenheim-
Skolem theorem to be true and valid about them. As mathemati-
cians put it, the Lowenheim-Skolem proof will not "go through" in 
legal English. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the con-
clusion of the proof, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, is true in 
legal English .... 20 
In response to Kress, D'Amato continued to assert that the 
L6wenheim-Skolem Theorem is relevant to law, but he argues in the 
alternative that, if legal English is not sufficiently formal for 
L6wenheim-Skolem to apply, that also demonstrates the indetermi-
nacy of law; that is, if law is not as formal as formal systems that are 
themselves indeterminate, law must also be indeterminate.21 
The same variety of attack as that directed at the use of the 
L6wenheim-Skolem Theorem may be offered with regard to the appli-
cation of G6del's Theorem to law. The proof of G6del's Theorem 
required that G6del express the metalanguage for arithmetic, the lan-
guage used to talk about arithmetic, within arithmetic itself.22 The 
theorem rests on G6del numbering in which propositions and theo-
rems of arithmetic are coded as numbers, the subject of arithmetic. If 
G6del's Theorem is to apply to law, it would appear that the same task 
would have to be accomplished for law. It is not sufficient to note that 
law may be self-referential or that law, like mathematics, may have 
rules and metarules.23 An analog of G6del's Theorem would require 
a demonstration that the metalanguage of law, legal English, can in 
some sense be embedded in the law. It is far from obvious that that 
can be accomplished; it is not even clear what it means.24 
20 Id. at 144. 
21 See D'Amato, supra note 15, at 176 n.92. 
22 See NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 13. 
23 See Rogers & Molzon, supra note 10, at 1002-21. 
24 Professor Farago suggests that the procedural rules of law can serve as the 
metalanguage and substantive law may serve as the object language and that any for-
malization oflawwould have to encompass both forms oflaw. Farago, supra note 9, at 
227. However, more is required than simply showing that both forms of law must be 
part of a legal system. The metalanguage must be embedded in the object language. 
Procedural law must be made a part of substantive law, and the debate over primary 
and secondary rules of law and the difficulty of fitting the secondary into the primary 
by using nullity as the analog of the sort of sanction contained in substantive laws 
demonstrate the problems inherent in such an attempt. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAw 28-35 (1961). 
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Rogers and Molzon do draw one important non-analytic conclu-
sion from their examination of Godel's Theorem. Even if Godel's 
Theorem does hold for law and prove law to be incomplete, "legal 
theorists must become comfortable with the incompleteness of legal 
systems, no matter how carefully constructed, in the same way that 
mathematicians and philosophers have become comfortable with the 
incompleteness of axiomatic systems of number theory."25 That is an 
important observation. The fact that incompleteness has not hobbled 
mathematicians, working with the seeming paradigm of certainty 
should relieve any anxieties over what Godel's Theorem might say 
about the incompleteness of law. Furthermore, as I have argued else-
where,26 incompleteness is a far lesser weakness than the radical inde-
terminacy that some argue is true of law. Incompleteness means only 
that there are propositions for which neither the proposition nor its 
negation is provable. Even with the infinity of such propositions 
Godel proved are present in any formalization of arithmetic, there are 
still propositions of arithmetic that are provable. Thus, even if 
Godel's Theorem did carry over to law, it would only show that there 
are hard cases, even an infinity of them, but not that all cases are 
undecidable. 
In this last respect, that is with regard to the fact that logic or 
mathematics has been capable of handling difficult situations thereby 
providing hope for proceeding in the face of analogous difficulties in 
law, one additional word should be said. Scholars in the Critical Legal 
Studies movement (the Crits) have argued that law is hopelessly con-
flicted and have pointed to what they see as contradictions in particu-
lar areas of law as evidence.27 If classical logic were to be the guide as 
to the nature of legal systems containing such contradictions, the pic-
ture would be grim. Under the principles of propositional logic any-
thing and everything may be implied from a logical contradiction. 
Thus, once one contradiction is found, any other proposition and its 
negation are both provable, and the entire system is comprised of con-
tradictions. Under such a logic, the identification of one of the con-
tradictions the Crits assert would logically lead to the conclusion that 
the entire system of law is contradictory. Here, too, it is important to 
25 Rogers & Molzon, supra note 10, at 992. 
26 See Kevin W. Saunders, Realism, Ratiocination, and Rules, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 219, 
229 (1993). 
27 For an overview of the Critical Legal Studies movement, see MARK. KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). The arguments of the Crits do not proceed 
only from examples but also draw power from the presence of psychological conflict 
in each individual leading to opposing desires for the role of law. This conflict, tug-
ging law in opposing directions, gives rise to conflicting legal outcomes. 
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note that logic is not a single, universally applicable system. Indeed, 
there is ongoing work to develop logics capable of handling contradic-
tions without leading to the entire system being contradictory. Those 
logics, known as paraconsistency logics,28 have been seen to have 
some application in law.29 Under such a logic, the individual conflicts 
identified by the Crits would not logically lead to universal legal 
conflict.30 
The recognition that paraconsistency logic could be useful in law 
rests on the position that logic is a tool rather than simply a standard. 
If paraconsistency logic turns out to work well for law, it should be 
used. The same is true for other logics. Law regularly employs vague 
terms, and this raises difficulty under standard two valued proposi-
tionallogic and its predicate logic extension. The solution may be the 
use of a different logic. Indeed, there is legal scholarship employing 
fuzzy logic, in which membership in a class is not a yes or no proposi-
tion but one that takes a value on the interval from zero to one.31 
This suggestion that law serve as a tool rather than as a standard 
may appear caviler, and indeed the immediate reaction, when law or 
legal argument faces logical difficulty, should not be the rejection of 
logic. Nonetheless, if after serious consideration of the difference be-
tween a legal position or view as to the nature of law' and logic, one is 
not willing to give up the legal position, it may well be the logic that is 
not up to the task. The concept of entailment of one proposition 
from another in law may differ from that expressed by the connective 
in propositional logic. The concept of a search being reasonable may 
be fuzzy rather than two valued. The complex nature of the legal 
proposition may make it practically unamenable to inclusion within 
the formulae of the logical system under consideration. 
II. LOGIC AND THE PRACTICE OF LAw 
The use of logic to analyze and evaluate the sort of argument 
used in the practice of law would appear more promising, and indeed, 
28 The ground breaking work in this area is that of Graham Priest. See GRAHAM 
PRIEST, IN CONTRADICTION: A STUDY IN THE TRANSCONSISTENT (1987); P ARACONSISTENT 
LOGIC: ESSAYS ON THE INCONSISTENT (Graham Priest et al. eds., 1989). 
29 A recent conference in Ghent, Belgium, in the summer of 1997, included pa-
pers such as Francisco Jose Diaz Ausin & Lorenzo Pena, Paraconsistent Deontic Logic 
with Enforceable Rights and Jair Minoro Abe & Leonardo Pujatti, Paraconsistent Legal 
Knowledge Engineering (unpublished manuscripts on file with the author). 
30 The psychological conflicts discussed in supra note 27, to the extent that they 
apply universally, would still provide an argument for universal legal contradiction. 
31 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 
685 (1996). 
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it does not face the sort of problems as occurred in the use of logic to 
divine the nature of law. Even here, however, some caution should be 
exercised in treating logic as normative for the purpose of accepting 
or rejecting arguments. In a book, perhaps unique among those ti-
tled Logic for its lack of formality, John Dewey argues against taking 
logic as an a priori standard against which to measure anything. He 
argues that logic is a field of inquiry having at least somewhat of an 
empirical nature.32 The rules and procedures for the conduct of in-
quiry, that is the rules and procedures of logic, should be derived 
from successful inquiry. Arguments that have proven successful 
should be the guides in developing addition~ arguments. 
Standard propositional and predicate logic are, in effect, the 
study of successful or convincing argument. While they are axiomatic 
systems, they are systems based on axioms that capture principles that 
have proven successful in convincing an audience or reader. Logic 
does capture the forms of successful argument, but the argument 
forms it captures are those of philosophy, mathematics, and perhaps 
some of the sciences. When a legal argument fails to follow one of the 
forms, it is not necessarily flawed but may indicate an area in which 
legal argumentation differs from argument in other areas. But, while 
not necessarily flawed, the contravention of some rule of logic should 
call for an explanation as to why that rule should be disregarded for 
legal argument. 
The best examples of acceptable legal arguments that violate 
what are elsewhere accepted as principles of logic are to be found in 
informal logic and in particular the informal fallacies. Arguments 
based on an appeal to authority, the argumentum ad vericundiam, are 
said to be flawed. In most situations, such an argument is in fact 
flawed. If two philosophers argue a point in metaphysics, the argu-
ment is not won simply by asserting that Plato held a particular posi-
tion. Plato holding the view does not make it correct. It should be 
the strength of the argument, not the person who has asserted it, that 
provides its weight.33 The same is not true of law, where there are 
persons whose opinions or statements, because of the position held, 
are entitled to weight, even to the point of being controlling. While it 
may not win the argument to assert the position of Plato, if the 
32 SeeJoHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 1-22 (1938). 
33 That may not be true when the argument is over some empirical issue, rather 
than a philosophical issue. If the debate is between two amateur cosmologists, the 
fact that Professor Hawking has made a statement that backs one side of the debate 
would appear to be the sort of appeal to authority that should not be classified as an 
informal logical fallacy. 
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Supreme Court has directly spoken on a legal issue, that fact at least 
goes a long way toward winning the legal debate. 
A similar point regarding informal fallacies not applying to law 
may be made with regard to the argumentum ad hominem, an argument 
directed against the person asserting a position rather than against 
the argument the person offered to support the position. Again, in a 
philosophical debate, an argument is not weakened by the characteris-
tics of the person offering the argument. A response of, "What would 
you expect from an admitted Marxist?" does not address the validity of 
the argument that the Marxist offered. The response should be met 
with the accusation that the speaker is resorting to an ad hominem, and 
the response should be dismissed. Since this has been an accepted 
principle, or a successful form or inquiry or argument, that would 
seem to provide some basis for accepting it as an informal fallacy in 
legal argument. However, the application to law should not be too 
broad. Legal argument is not only about abstract, theoretical issues, 
where an ad hominem is flawed. It is also about factual matters, and 
there an argument directed to the person might be appropriate. If a 
purported witness to a crime has a personal interest in the outcome of 
the trial resulting from the accusation, that fact should be available for 
impeachment of the witness, and impeachment would seem to be a 
form of ad hominem. Similarly, the rules of evidence allow the use of 
some sorts of bad character evidence for impeachment purposes.34 
On the other hand, in some circumstances, the courts have warned 
against the use of the ad hominem. In United States v. Biasucci,35 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found inappro-
priate the prosecutor responding to defense counsel by addressing 
the attorney as "you sleaze" and "you hypocritical son -" and describ-
ing counsel as "unlearned in the law."36 The Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Young,37 also called on both prosecutors and defense 
counsel to refrain from ad hominems directed against the other. 
The difference between accepting ad hominems directed against 
witnesses but not against opposing counsel or the court is explained 
by the differing roles of witnesses, on one hand, and counselor 
judges, on the other. The role of counsel is, in addition to question-
ing witnesses, the presentation of argument. That argument should 
stand or fall of its own power and an attack on the person offering the 
34 See FED. R. EVID. 609 (use of prior conviction); FED. R. EVID. 608 (character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness). 
35 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986). 
36 Id. at 514 n.9. 
37 470 u.s. 1 (1985). 
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argument is a fallacy. The judge, in issuing rulings on law, is in much 
the same position. The witness, on the other hand, offers evidence 
with regard to what has or has not occurred; the assertions are factual. 
The veracity of the testimony may be affected by bias or untrustworthi-
ness, and pointing out that potential is not the invocation of a falla-
cious argument. In effect, the only way to evaluate the testimony of a 
witness is an evaluation of veracity. The evaluation of an argument by 
counsel or a decision by the judge should be based on the logic of the 
argument or the logic supporting the decision. 
Most of the informal fallacies face similar questions in application 
to law,38 but what of more formal logic? Here there would seem to be 
less reason to distinguish law from other fields. If logic has recog-
nized certain forms of argument as valid, and a legal argument goes 
beyond or contradicts one of those forms, that would appear to be a 
solid reason for calling the validity of the argument into question. 
Here logic may be of service to the law, by identifying problems with 
arguments. Even here, however, it must be recognized that some-
times the seeming difference in logic may be nothing more than a 
linguistic difficulty, and that the law has come to the proper solution. 
Logic can also help law in finding the best language to express the 
rules adopted by legal institutions. 
An example both of linguistic error and providing better phras-
ing of a rule is provided by an analysis I undertook of the evidence 
rules regarding the proof of a negative.39 Evidence law asserts that it 
is difficult to prove a negative, and when a party is faced with such a 
burden, the burden should be shifted to the other party.40 There is, 
however, nothing inherently difficult in proving a negative, so the rule 
of evidence would appear logically flawed. The situations in which it 
is more difficult to prove a negation do not have to do with the nega-
tion but with the difference in difficulty between proving universal 
and existential propositions in predicate logic. The universal, "for 
every x, A is true of x," is more difficult to prove than the existential, 
"there is an x, such that A is true of x." The existential is proved by 
identifying the x for which A is true. The universal requires either 
38 See Kevin W. Saunders, Informal Fallacies in Legal Argument, 44 S.C. L. REv. 343 
(1993). On informal fallacies, see generally RUGGERO J. ALoISERT, LoGIC FOR LAw-
YERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING (2d ed. 1992), and IRVING M. COP! & CAru. 
CoHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LoGIC (8th ed. 1990). 
39 See Kevin W. Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 SETON HALL 
L. REv. 276 (1985). 
40 See, e.g., Walker v. Carpenter, 57 S.E. 461, 461 (N.C. 1907) ("The first rule 'laid 
down in the books on evidence is to the effect that the issue must be proved by the 
party who states an affirmative, not by the party who states a negative."). 
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examining all x's to see that A is true for each or reasoning to the 
conclusion that A must be true for all x's. The reason that the nega-
tive appears more difficult to prove in law is that a legal case is more 
likely to turn on an existential claim, and the negative of that claim is 
a universal. 
Despite this apparent error, the judges have regularly identified 
instances in which a particular negative proposition was difficult to 
prove.41 Those instances have been cases in which the negative was a 
universal. Where the particular negative was not so difficult, special 
rules have been adopted not requiring a shift in burden, such as in 
instances "where a particular fact necessary to be proved rests pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of one of the parties."42 In such instances 
the negative has been the negation of an unquantified proposition or 
the negation of a universal, which is an existential. The point is that, 
despite the appearance of an error in logic, the real difficulty was not 
in the outcomes but in the failure to recognize the real problem or 
attach the proper label. A judiciary better schooled in logic would 
have better stated the rule, but the lack of such schooling did not lead 
to incorrect results. The logician, in the tradition of Dewey, can study 
the successful shifting of burdens and find the rule that states the 
practice more simply than it had been stated by the courts. Rather 
than a shift, when faced with the burden of proving a negative with 
exceptions for situations where the negative is not difficult to prove, a 
rule shifting the burden when a party is faced 'with proving a universal 
is far more simply stated and more accurate from a logical point of 
view. Logic here has been of service to the law. 
Logic can also be of service to the law in the drafting of statutes. 
Layman Allen43 and others44 have discussed logical form in that area 
and have attempted to identi.:fY the sources of ambiguity in statutes. 
Much of the ambiguity in statutes, and in other statements of the law, 
results from the misuse of logical connectives or the failure to recog-
nize that it is unclear how portions of a complex proposition are to be 
41 See Saunders, supra note 39, and cases cited therein. 
42 Shumak v. Shumak, 332 N.E.2d 177,180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
43 See Layman E. Allen & C. Rudy Engholm, Nonnalized Legal Drafting and the Query 
Method, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 380 (1978); Layman E. Allen & Charles S. Saxon, One Use of 
Computerized Instructional Gaming in Legal Education: To Better Understand the Rich Logical 
Structure of Legal Rules and Improve Legal Writing, 18 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 383 (1985); 
Layman E. Allen, Plain Legal Drafting for the Electronic Age, in COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 
LAw 75 (Bryan Niblett ed. 1980); Layman E. Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool 
for Drafting and Interpreting Legal Documents, 66 YALE LJ. 833 (1957). 
44 In addition to those who have worked and written with Professor Allen, see 
supra note 43, see Grayfred B. Gray, Reducing Unintended Ambiguity in Statutes: An Intro-
duction to Normalization of Statutory Drafting, 54 TENN. L. REv. 433 (1987). 
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combined. To offer a technically ambiguous, but in practice clear, 
example, the rule "stop when school bus is loading and unloading 
children" admits of two readings. One of the readings, that one need 
stop only when some children are getting on and others are getting 
off, would seldom apply. The rule really should be phrased as "stop 
when school bus is loading or unloading children" or as "stop when 
school bus is loading children and stop when school bus is unloading 
children." A human reader understands the intent, but a computer 
application working with the statement would find some difficulty. 
III. LAw, LOGIC, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
There is a tie between the normal form for statutes espoused by 
Professor Allen and an area of potential future importance to law. Ar-
tificial intelligence has become a part of manufacturing and is impor-
tant in various fields of inquiry.45 Its potential for use in legal 
reasoning has been noted,46 and expert systems, capable of applying 
the law to fact patterns have been developed.47 Such a computerized 
system asks the user the relevant questions, applies rules to the infor-
mation provided, and arrives at a legal conclusion. Learning to ex-
press the rules of law in normalized form helps in expressing the rules 
as required in one of the more common expert system programming 
languages.48 Other approaches to artificial intelligence, neural net-
45 See generall:y MIKE SHARPLES ET AL., COMPUTERS AND THOUGHT: A PRACTICAL IN· 
TRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL lNrELLIGENCE (1989); ALExANDER E. SILVERMAN, MINn, 
MACHINE AND METAPHOR: AN ESSAY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REAsONING 
(1993); Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of 
Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE LJ. 1957 (1990). 
46 For a discussion of some of the possibilities and some of the difficulties of 
developing systems of artificial intelligence in law, see RICHARD E. SUSSKIND, EXPERT 
SYsTEMS IN LAw (1987). 
47 See, e.g., Grayfred B. Gray et al., Legal Expert System Building: A Semi-Intelligent 
Computer Program Makes It Easier, 12J. COMPo & INFo. L. 555 (1994); LT. Hardy, Creat-
ing an Expert System for Legislative History Research: Project CLEAR's "Lexpert, "85 LAw LIB. 
J. 239 (1993). I have also taught a seminar in expert systems in law in which law 
students, without a sophisticated background in computers, each developed an expert 
system for an area of law, using the VP-Expert shell program. An introduction to that 
shell program can be found in SYLVIA FRIEDERICH & MICHAEL GARGANO, EXPERT SYs-
TEMS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT USING VP-EXPERT (1989). 
48 For an introduction to the programming language referred to, see JEAN B. 
ROGERS, A TURBO PROLOG PRIMER (1987). 
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works for example,49 will also require logically unambiguous state-
ments of legal rules.50 
The study of logic by lawyers, law students and pre-law students 
should prove valuable in these areas. The resolution of the ambigui-
ties found in statutes may be a matter of statutory interpretation, per-
haps including an inquiry into legislative intent, that may not be pure 
logic. However, expressing the found intent of the statute requires a 
logically unambiguous combination of the terms interpreted. Here a 
logic trained lawyer is at an advantage. It is even more clear that an 
understanding of logic is required for artificial intelligence uses. 
Professor Wesley Hohfeld, in his attempt to clarify the legal terms 
"right," "duty," "privilege," "no-right," "power," "immunity," "disabil-
ity," and "liability," was motivated by a recognition that opaque lan-
guage can stand in the way of legal understanding. He said, quoting 
an older evidence treatise: 
As our law develops it becomes more and more important to give 
definiteness to its phraseology; discriminations multiply, new situa-
tions and complications of fact arise, and the old outfit of ideas, 
discriminations, and phrases has to be carefully revised. Law is not 
so unlike other subjects of human contemplation that clearness of 
thought will not help us powerfully in grasping it. 51 
That observation is of even more importance today. As Professor 
Allen has noted: 
With the advent of the digital computer and the power of electronic 
information retrieval systems, the precise usage and definition of 
words rises from the level of merely aiding the efficiency of a trans-
action between legal entities to that of being virtually essential, 
where computers are involved, if the transaction is to take place at 
all. Man learns by example and possesses the creativity to resolve 
ambiguities; . . . machines are considerably less sophisticated than 
men in taking into account the relevant features of the total context 
49 See Michael Aikenhead, The Uses and Abuses of Neural Networks in Law, 12 SANTA 
ClARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 31 (1996). 
50 Logical ambiguity is different from the ambiguity present in many legal terms. 
Logical ambiguity is present when it is unclear how the concepts are to be combined 
into complex propositions or arguments. Even when the logical structure is clear, 
ambiguity or vagueness of terms may be present. An expert system employing such 
terms may still operate, but judgment will be required on the part of the user in 
answering the questions put by the computer. 
51 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 29 n.25 (1913) (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PREUMINARY 
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 190 (1898)). 
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in dealing with problems. In general, a computer requires a clearer 
and more precise specification of the question to be resolved.52 
681 
The computer is a logical machine, and if legal analysis is ever to 
involve computers, not only the terms that concerned Hohfeld, but 
also the logical structure in which those terms can be combined and 
inferences drawn, must be developed. 
While teaching logic to those involved in law is a step toward this 
goal, the difficulty in attaining this goal is the great complexity of any 
logic providing a structure capable of capturing the meaning of even 
basic legal concepts and the varieties of argument involved in legal 
reasoning. Legal reasoning is at times deductive and at times by anal-
ogy. The logic of deduction is well developed compared to the logic 
of analogy, but even the application of deductive logic, propositional, 
predicate, modal, and deontic logic, runs into difficulty over the com-
plexity of the legal concepts involved. As an example of this complex-
ity, consider the concept of a Hohfeldian power, the capacity to 
perform some act that creates or terminates a legal relation.53 Build-
ing on a logic developed by Professor Allen54 that provides a structure 
for the analysis of "right," "duty," "no-right," and "privilege," I ex-
tended the logic to work with the remaining Hohfeldian relations. 55 
The definition provided there for "power" was 
(SLRy) [~LRy&(Sa) [~Bax&M'Bax&~OBax & (Bax::}LRy) ]] .56 
The formula is read as, "There exists a legal relation of person y 
such that the legal relation of y does not hold, and there exists an act 
a, such that a has not been done by person x and it is naturally possi-
ble57 that a can be done by x and it is not obligatory that a be done by 
x and if a were done by x, the legal relation ofy would hold." While 
the reading would seem quite complex, the true complexity, and the 
number of unresolved issues in logic, are just barely hinted at by the 
formula. 
The logic within which the above formula was expressed and 
could be logically combined with other propositions was built on a 
52 Layman E. Allen, Formalizing Hohfoldian Anarysis to Clarify the Multiple Senses of 
'Legal Right': APowerfulLensfortheElectronicAge, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 428, 428-29 (1974). 
53 See Hohfeld, supra note 51, at 44-45. 
54 See Allen, supra note 52. 
55 See Kevin W. Saunders, A Formal Logic for the Anarysis of Hohfoldian Relations, 23 
AKRON L. REv. 465 (1990). 
56 fd. at 498. 
57 Natural possibility is a stronger requirement than logical possibility. Logical 
possibility would require only that the act not be some sort of contradiction that, no 
matter what the world were like, could not be done. Natural possibility requires that 
the act can be done, consistent with the laws of nature. 
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propositional logic base, but recognized one of the difficulties of pro-
positional logic. That difficulty is in capturing the natural language 
meaning of the "if p, then q" proposition. Propositional logic is based 
on a truth functional definition in which "p--7q" is true, so long as it is 
not the case both that "p" is true and "q" is false. Logicians have long 
been dIssatisfied with this treatment of conditionals, since the ordi-
nary language use of conditionals seems to require some connection 
between the antecedent and consequent other than a relationship of 
truth values. This dissatisfaction has led to the development of modal 
logics58 and relevance logics.59 Professor Allen's system, underlying 
the formula, uses a relevance logic. If there were but one relevance 
logic, or one generally accepted as best capturing the meaning of con-
ditionals, the inclusion of that logic would make the system more 
complex but would not inject any controversy. However, there is not 
such agreement on relevance logic, and such logics are the topic of 
current research.60 Until relevance logic is adequately developed, 
there may be questions over the logical treatment of conditionals in 
legal argument. 
The logic also has to have the axioms required to handle predi-
cate logic. In fact, since the formula above contains quantification 
over both individual persons and over relations, it must be a second 
order predicate logic. 
The "M" in the formula requires that the logic also contain modal 
logic, a logic capable of handling necessity and possibility, as well as 
truth and falsity. Again, while the inclusion of such a logic adds to the 
complexity of the system, the real difficulty is in deciding which modal 
system to include.61 While Professor Allen and I built our systems on 
a modal system that is not controversial with regard to what can be 
58 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
59 For one of the earlier detailed considerations of the issue, see ALAN Ross AN-
DERSON & NUEL D. BELNAP, JR., ENTAILMENT: THE LOGIC OF RELEVANCE AND NECESSITY 
(1975). Relevance logics require some conceptual connection between the antece-
dent and consequent of a conditional. 
60 See, e.g.,Josep Maria Font & Gonzalo Rodriguez, Algebraic Study of Two Deductive 
Systems of Relevance Logic, 3 NOTRE DAME]. FORMAL LOGIC 369 (1994); Mark Lance & 
Philip Kremer, The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment II: Systems of Relevant Com-
mitment Entailment, 25]. PHIL. LOGIC 425 (1996); Francesco Paoli, Semantics for First 
Degree Relatedness Logic, 27 REp. MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 81 (1993); Greg Restall, Four-
Valued Semantics faT Relevant Logics (and Some of their Rivals), 24 J. PHIL. LOGIC 139 
(1995). 
61 For a general discussion of modal logic and various systems of modal logic, see 
D. PAUL SNYDER, MODAL LOGIC AND ITs A,ppuCATIONS (1971), G.E. HUGHES & MJ. 
CRESSWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODAL LOGIC (2d prtg. 1972) and CLARENCE IRVING 
LEWIS & COOPER HAROLD LANGFORD, SYMBOUC LOGIC (1932). 
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derived, it is a system that may be too weak for artificial intelligence 
purposes. The weaker, less controversial, modal systems allow the pos-
sibility of strings of modal operators, the "M" of possibility or the "L" 
of necessity, to build up. In the human generated proofs of Allen's 
and my work that did not occur, but with a computer manipulating 
formulas, perhaps with more randomness and less view toward a par-
ticular goal, such strings might develop. 
Stronger modal systems allow the derivation of simpler strings 
from long strings. The early attempts at developing such systems re-
sulted in the system S4, which allowed all strings to reduce to one of 
the following: "p," "Lp," "Mp," "LMp," "MLp," "LMLp," "MLMp," or 
the negation of one of the foregoing, and S5, in which all strings re-
duce to the last modal operator in the string. S4 is viewed as too weak, 
given the strings that remain, and S5 is too strong, since anything that 
is possibly necessary turns out to be necessary. Dissatisfaction with 
both systems has led to the development of systems with a strength 
between the two,62 but again there is no consensus on the best modal 
system, and that dispute will be incorporated into any debate over the 
best system for use in artificial intelligence and law. 
The formula also contains the operator "0," which requires a sys-
tem of deontic logic that considers obligation and permission. Deon-
tic logic is itself an area of ongoing research,63 and any difficulty or 
disagreement in that area will carry over to a logic capable of captur-
ing basic legal concepts. 
Lastly, the "=>" in the formula does not represent the standard 
conditional. It is instead the counterfactual conditional; that is, 
"p=>q" is read as "if p were the case, then q would be the case." The 
logic must differ from material implication, the usual "P-7q," since it 
is used when p is not the case, and when "p" is false, "p-7q" is always 
true. The representation of Hohfeld's relations then requires a logic 
62 The systems are between S4 and S5 in the sense that any theorem of S4 can be 
proven in the system, and the system can be used to prove additional theorems, all of 
which are theses in S5, but cannot be used to prove all the theses of S5. For a discus-
sion of some of the systems between S4 and S5, see HUGHES & CRESSWELL, supra note 
61, at 260-64. There are also systems weaker than S5, in that they contain some but 
not all of the theorems of S5, but not as strong as S4, in that they do not contain all 
the theorems of S4; as well as systems stronger than S4 but not contained in S5, in the 
sense that they contain theorems that cannot be proven in S5. See id. at 264-67. 
63 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON DEONTIC LoGIC IN COMPUTERSCIENCE, 
DEONTIC LOGIC, AGENCY AND NORMATIVE SYSTEMS (Mark A. Brown et al. eds., 1996); 
Mark A. Brown, A Logic of Comparative Obligation, 57 STUDIA LOGICA 117 (1996); Lou 
Goble, 'Ought' and Extensionality, 30 Nous 330 (1996); John F. Horty, Agent.)' and Obli-
gation, 108 SYNTHESE 269 (1996); Edwin Mares, AndeT"sonian Deontic Logic, 58 THEORIA 3 
(1992). 
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of counterfactual conditionals.64 Again, there is not general agree-
ment over what that logic should be,65 and again that disagreement 
will carry over to the logic necessary for artificial intelligence and law. 
The difficulties discussed so far are only those present in analyz-
ing the deductive aspects of legal logic and making them amenable to 
artificial intelligence. Perhaps an even greater challenge is presented 
by the fact that much of legal argument is not deductive but is instead 
argument by analogy.66 The internal working of an expert system 
based on deductive logic is relatively simple compared to a logic for 
analogy. Indeed, it might even be questioned whether analogy is a 
form oflogic. Professor Cass Sunstein describes the form of argument 
by analogy as being "(1) A has characteristic X; (2) B shares that char-
acteristic; (3) A also had characteristic Y; (4) Because A and B share 
characteristic X, we conclude what is not yet known, that B shares 
characteristic Y as well."67 Professor Scott Brewer has a similar defini-
tion based on more instances than A and more shared characteristics 
than X.68 The form is similar, but the greater number of instances in 
which X has been accompanied by Y, and the more characteristics 
shared by A and B, increase the force of the analogy. 
The argument form, as characterized by Sunstein, is obviously not 
a form of deductive logic. It might be questioned whether it is logic at 
64 See generally DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACI'UALS (1973). 
65 The system in Saunders, supra note 55, includes a logic for counterfactuals 
presented in JOHN L. POLLOCK, SUBjUNCrIVE REAsONING (1976). That system is weaker 
than the system in LEWIS, supra note 63. If the treatment of counterfactuals proves 
not to be sufficiently powerful for working with Hohfeldian relations, there will be an 
issue over how strong to make the system. 
66 For discussions of the role of analogical reasoning in law, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1993), and Scott Brewer, Exemplary 
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 
HARv. L. REv. 925 (1996). 
67 Sunstein, supra note 66, at 743. 
68 Professor Brewer explains the form as follows: 
Where x, y, z are individuals and F, G, H, are predicates of individuals: 
Step 1: z has characteristics F, G, ... 
Step 2: x, y, ... have characteristics F, G, ... 
Step 3: x, y, ... also have characteristic H. 
Step 4: The presence in an individual of characteristics F, G, ... provides 
sufficient warrant for inferring that H is also present in that individual. 
Step 5: Therefore, there is sufficient warrant to conclude that H is present in 
z. 
Brewer, supra note 66, at 966 (footnote omitted). 
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all,69 since experience with deductive logic leads to the expectation 
that logical conclusions follow with certainty, a certainty lacking in an-
alogical reasoning. It is interesting that Professor Brewer likens anal-
ogy to abduction, a principle that holds that if X occurs, and Y would 
explain the occurrence, there is reason to accept y.70 However, the 
same complaint could be offered against abduction. Nonetheless, if 
analogy is a successful form of argument, then with Dewey, it should 
be accepted as a part of the study of logic despite its lack of deductive 
surety. Furthermore, it is clear that analogy is both a successful and 
necessary part of legal argumentation. Professor Sunstein calls ana-
logical reasoning "the most familiar form of legal reasoning,"71 and 
Professor Brewer calls it legal argument's "own distinct method."72 
The entire working of the common law is based on analogy. Case A 
has been decided, case B is like case A in certain relevant facts, there-
fore the result in case B should be the same as that in case A. 
The importance of analogical reasoning to legal argument, the 
claim that it is even the hallmark of legal argument, make it clear that 
for artificial intelligence to be applied to law, the workings of analogi-
cal argument must be explicated with sufficient clarity so as to allow a 
computer to draw proper analogical conclusions while avoiding un-
warranted conclusions. There are, in fact, attempts to replicate ana-
logical reasoning in artificial intelligence applications to law. Some 
early work in the area was that of Professor Thome McCarty,73 but 
more recent efforts have been by Professor Kevin Ashley.74 
Professor Ashley's program HYPO is an attempt to model the use 
of precedent in case based argument. HYPO includes a knowledge 
base of cases in trade secret law. If the program is supplied with a set 
of facts, including the positions of the two parties to a suit, it searches 
for the cases most on point supporting the potential outcomes. HYPO 
also distinguishes the precedents by searching for facts in the prece-
dent that are not present in the case at issue. 
69 Professor Sunstein notes the unwillingness on the part of some to accept ana-
logical reasoning as even being a form of reasoning. See Sunstein, supra note 66, at 
74l. 
70 See Brewer, supra note 66, at 947-48, 962. 
71 Sunstein, supra note 66, at 74l. 
72 Brewer, supra note 66, at 926. 
73 See L. Thome McCarty, Reflections on TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial Intelli-
gence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARv. L. REv. 837 (1977). 
74 KEvIN D. AsHLEY, MODELING LEGAL ARGUMENT: REAsONING WITH CAsES AND Hy-
POTHETICALS (1990). Ashley's work is also described in Rissland, supra note 45, at 
1971-73. 
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While HYPO is an impressive effort at modeling legal reasoning, 
there are limitations. Certainly, if a case is on all fours with a prece-
dent in the knowledge base, a result can be generated. It is even pos-
sible to assign weights to particular varieties of facts, so that an 
analogical reasoning program can do more than simply count points 
of similarity, or assign additional or less weight, when particular facts 
differ in degree. For example, when the precedent case was based on 
a threshold monetary value, a greater value might require that greater 
weight be given to any implications to be drawn from facts involving 
monetary value. 75 
Problems with the model may arise, however, from the limitations 
on the knowledge base. The base is trade secret law, so analogies can 
only be drawn from that area. That would usually be the proper base 
for a trade secret law decision, but sometimes an analogy might be 
drawn from another area of the law. Perhaps it will be a copyright 
case that provides the most important precedent. At least in difficult 
cases, while guidance is first drawn from precedents in the same area 
of the law, there may be instances where the most forceful analogies 
are to be drawn from another area of the law.76 Ident:ifYing those in-
stances may require an analysis of the policies behind the rules laid 
down by the precedents. HYPO is not able to bring into the argument 
those policy concerns. 
Analogical reasoning is simply a difficult area to capture logically. 
As Professor Brewer says, "There is an art to making apt, instructive, 
compelling analogies."77 While he maintains that there is also a logic 
to the task,78 that logic is difficult to characterize. Brewer does at-
tempt to do so, stating: 
[I] n order for an argument by analogy to be compelling-to have 
... rational force-there must be sufficient warrant to believe that 
the presence in an "analogized" item of some particular characteris-
tic or characteristics allows one to infer the presence in that item of 
some particular other characteristic. It is this sufficient warrant that 
I have labeled 'analogy warranting rule.' An analogy warranting 
75 Rissland, supra note 45, at 1972 n.70, describes the use, in HYPO, of disparity 
between plaintiff's and defendant's development costs, suggesting that where a tlvo to 
one ratio has been sufficient to recover, a four to one ratio should add strength. 
76 Professor Dworkin allows for local priority in case law reasoning but suggests 
that there are times when the judge should look for fit betlveen cases by progressing 
through a series of concentric circles of cases. Where local priority matches moral 
principles, it is important, but where the boundaries that mark out the local are 
mechanical and arbitrary, there is less reason to be limited to the local cases. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 250-53 (1986). 
77 Brewer, supra note 66, at 964. 
78 See id. 
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rule states the logical relation between those characteristics of com-
pared items that are known to be shared and those that are in-
ferred. Another important component in a compelling .argument 
by analogy is what I have called the 'analogy warranting ration-
ale' .... [R]ationales stand to rules in the two closely associated 
relations of explanation and justifications-that is, rationales ex-
plain and justify rules.79 
The problem is with the "logical relation" between the character-
istics shared and those inferred. That relationship must not be suffi-
ciently strong so as to logically entail the conclusion, or the reasoning 
would not really be analogical. It would instead be a predicate logic 
argument of the form "for all x with properties A, B, C, x also has 
property D. Individual y has properties A, B, C. Therefore, y has 
property D." The "logical relation" must be something weaker, and 
the relation would seem difficult to capture in logical form. Addi-
tional work in the logical analysis of analogical reasoning will be 
required.80 
There would then appear to be two areas in which logic must 
develop to be of service in the effort to apply artificial intelligence to 
law. More work is required on the deductive aspects of legal reason-
ing because systems within which to manipulate the logically sophisti-
cated concepts of law must be developed. Secondly, the logic of 
analogical reasoning requires further examination, since it is so im-
portant to legal reasoning. Neither of these tasks will prove to be 
simple. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This symposium celebrates the publication of a book in logic and 
law. That is an important step. Few have been exposed to the subject 
in any depth. There are certainly logicians looking at law, but there 
are relatively few scholars, many of whom were taught by or worked 
with Layman Allen, who have the insights that training in both logic 
and law can bring. The exposure of pre-law students, or law students, 
to logic helps to address some of the issues I have raised. Those who 
have training in both areas will recognize the misuses of logic and will 
be more able to analyze the validity of legal argumentation. 
Of course, a deeper understanding of the two fields is required to 
advance legal logic in the directions indicated. The exposure of stu-
79 [d. at 965 (footnote omitted). 
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dents to the basics of logic and law is a step, because some of those 
students may become sufficiently interested to study the area in more 
depth. A larger community of scholars can provide the interaction 
and support necessary for progress. Interaction between law schools 
and logic or computer science departments, including joint appoint-
ments, LL.M. or SJ.D. programs for legal academics interested in 
learning legal logic and doctoral or post-doctoral opportunities for 
logicians and computer scientists interested in increasing their under-
standing of law might be encouraged. It is training in both fields or 
cooperation among scholars in both areas that will assure that logical 
developments in the area are more than interesting exercises for logi-
cians but are also of practical value to law and lawyers. 
